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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

This Document contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States, within the meaning of Title 18, Sections 793 and 794, of the U.S. Code, as

| SUBJECT Conditions in Shanghai and Other Areas DATE DISTR. 30 October of Communist China NO. OF PAGES 2 X1DATE OF INFO. PLACE ACQUIRED Government Policy X1 1 | 25) r 1953 25) |
|---|----------------------|
| Government Policy X1 ACQUIRED The Chinese Communist government did not want to start or fig in another war. The five-year plan was considered more important than a move against Taiwan or Hong Kong, or even large-scale aid to the Democrati Republic of Vietnam. 2. Soviet advisers were being used by the Chinese Communists in industry and military affairs, but they did not have any appreciable effect on Chinese domestic policy and little effect on its foreign policy. X1 3. There was no campaign comparable to the three-anti's movement of electron in Shanghai; the audience was small, however, mostly because few people had | 25) |
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| 1952 in China. It was not against the law to listen to the Voice of Ameri in Shanghai; the audience was small, however, mostly because few people had | |
| | ca. |
| X1 radios good enough to receive the broadcasts X1 Shanghai residents believed the broadcasts fully; most, however, found the broadcasts poorly organized and presented. | |
| 4. The Chinese Communist government had made certain mistakes. The new marri law had not been well received, especially by the conservative people in t small villages, and the Communists had shelved it for the time being. The was also much bureaucracy and red tape, and the Communists realized that t was hurting them. | he re |
| Elections in China were controlled, not by forcing people to vote in a cer way, but in the stage of the nominations by seeing that only Party members were nominated. | tain |
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- 6. The Information Administration of the central government was never actually abolished in August 1952, but it did undergo an extensive reorganization.
- 7. The Shanghai Municipal Government as a civilian organization has functioned since 1952, when CH'EN I was re-elected mayor. Shanghai was definitely moving away from military control. There was no curfew. As a special municipality, Shanghai was directly responsible to the central government, just as Canton.

Construction and Jute Cultivation

8. The most impressive thing about China was the amount of building construction going on. A great number of brick works had been established, and many factories and laborers houses were being constructed. Along the railroad from Shanghai to Canton there was also a distinct increase in the growing of jute. Almost every farmer had a small patch of jute.

Care for Returning Overseas Chinese

9. T'AN Kah kee (CH'EN Chia-keng, 7115/0857/1649) in July was still one of the most important members of the Commission for Overseas Chinese Affairs of the government. The government was making special efforts to take care of overseas Chinese; they had set up special schools to look after overseas children, and made special efforts to provide housing and employment for returnees. Middle schools in China were woefully deficient in room for students. While the average Chinese was not able to get his boy into middle school, those coming from overseas were not only given priority but always got a place. Other schools in China seemed to have adequate room to take care of all students.

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